Using data on a trust game played in six Latin American cities we estimate the relationship between religious participation with trust and reciprocity. We find no association with trust but we do find a statistically significant relation with reciprocity. More religious people tend to reciprocate more than less religious people even though their trustiness on others is about the same as that of less religious people.
Introduction
Religion and religiosity can be important factors affecting social behavior and economic outcomes (Weber, 1930) , mental health, marital stability and other social issues (Iannacone, 1998) . Some studies have also linked religion with improved economic growth (Barro and McClearly, 2003) through its effect on the accumulation of social capital (Putnam, 2000) , the latter being measured either as cooperative behavior, participation on voluntary associations or voluntary giving.
Religion has been linked to economic and social variables such as trade attitudes and economic performance. Some religious beliefs, such as Post-Vatican II Catholisicm may affect economic outcomes because they are critical about trusting other individuals outside their own beliefs, while the opposite effect occurs with Protestantism which foster attitudes leading to better economic outcomes through a more positive trustworthy attitude towards others (Putnam, 1993 , Daniels et al, 2010 .
The evidence of the effect of religion on social capital (cooperative behavior) is mixed. Studies on this topic can be classified as survey-based and experimentally-based.
Survey based studies use self-reported information on cooperative behavior. The World Value Surveys (worldwide) and Latinobarómetro (for Latin America) are two commonly used databases that allow for international comparison. Cooperative behavior is associated with self-reported trust on others (horizontal trust) and/or self-reported trust on different types of organizations (vertical trust) . The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the question ability of their behavioral relevance (Fehr et al 2003) .
Experimentally based studies attempt to overcome some of the difficulties of studies based on self-reported data but may suffer from other problems such as self-selection biases and homogeneous pools measures (Fehr et al, 2003) .The main methodological difference with the previous studies is that cooperation data is derived from the behavior of individuals in laboratory experiments, which means that in a certain sense it is based in the reveled preference axiom. Our paper falls into this second category.
The empirical literature on the relationship between religion and trust is small but growing, while results are mixed (Anderson et al, 2010) . For example, in a series of Prisoner Dilemma experiments in two American cities that differed markedly with respect to their religion characteristics (Mormons and Secular), Orbellet al (1992) could not find any statistically significant relation between religion and cooperative behavior. They find, however some evidence of the relevance of contextual effects, such as the religious composition of the city, which may boost cooperative behavior among members of their own faith.
On the other hand, working with a small sample of 47 individuals who were asked about their religious beliefs and to play standard dictator and ultimatum games (to elicit their social preferences), Tan (2006) finds that although a general measure of religiosity does not significantly affect social behavior, certain dimensions of religiosity do have a significant effect 2 . Following the same methodology, Tan and Vogel (2008) 3 , investigate the relationship between trust (cooperative behavior), religiosity and reciprocity.
Controlling for gender effects, they find that trust and reciprocity increase with religiosity.
In their trust game experimental study for rural Bangladesh, Johansson-Stenmanet al (2009) find no statistically significant effect of religious differences on trust behavior and trustworthiness (reciprocity) among Muslims and Hindus, the two major religions in Bangladesh. Johansson-Stenman et al, however, do not focus their study on the analysis of the differences in behavior between individuals of different religions. Ruffle and Sosis (2007) conduct a set of public good games among members of religious and secular kibbutzim in Israel. They find that orthodox (more religious) males make more contributions to other orthodox men than orthodox women do and more than secular males contribute to other secular men. The authors point that there are certain "costs" to be in a religious kibbutz like daily prayers that can act as signaling devices of cooperative behavior. The authors conclude that religiosity tends to favor in-group 2 Tan distinguishes among three dimensions of religiosity: belief, experience and ritual. The first consists on statements of faith about the existence of a divine being. The spiritual dimension measures the extent to which individuals perceived themselves as to have had encounters of a religious content. The ritual dimension measures involvement in religious practices. 3 The characteristics of the sample are not specified. They worked with a sample of 48 individuals, of whom 60.4% are women. The survey was distributed via e-mail and the experiment took place at the European University Viadrina, Germany cooperation (i.e. trust) but is unable to assert the effect of religiosity on other individuals of a different group. In this sense religiosity is like being a member of any club.
Survey based studies on the effect of religion on cooperative behavior reach also mixed results. As part of their study of the effect of trust on growth and using data from the World Value Surveys for 41 countries, Zak and Knack (2001) test the relation between selfreported religion preferences and religion heterogeneity on self-reported trust. They find a negative effect of religion (being a catholic) preferences on trust 4 , which means that religious affiliation may be detrimental to growth, similar to the conclusions reached by Putnam (2000) . On the other hand, Guiso et al (2003) use World Value Survey data to test the relation between vertical and horizontal trust and cooperation and its impact on economic growth. Contrary to Zak and Knack (2001) , they find a positive relation between both trust indicators and religion, while being a Christian is associated with attitudes that might have a positive effect on growth.
Finally, using data from Latinobarómetro, Brañas-Garza et al (2009) Three other improvements relate to the database. First, our data comes from lab experiments in six Latin American cities. None of the studies include experimental settings
The primary focus of their study is the amount of financial services produced in the presence of moral hazard problems between brokers and clients. Higher levels of trust reduce transaction costs and increase the amount of financial services produced in the economy.
employs Latin American subjects and neither uses cross country data. To our knowledge, the only study that includes Latin American individuals is Brañas-Garza et al which is based on self-reported measures of trust and religion derived from the Latinobarómetro survey. Second, all previous experimentally based studies are based on small samples of players. In this paper we work with more than 3,100 players. Third, other studies use nonrepresentative individuals (e.g. students) while we work with a sample built to empirically reproduce the socio-economic structure of the six cities considered.
We introduce our setting in the next section. We describe the econometric methodology in section 3. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data for this paper was collected for a research project on Social exclusion in Latin America financed by the IADB. 5 The IADB project was based on a set of experimental games (a bilateral one shot trust game, a public good game, and a risk taking game) on six Latin American cities. After the games were played individuals were surveyed and information on individual characteristics including religious participation was gathered.
The six cities were Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San José (Costa Rica). The individuals were selected based on convenient samples aimed at obtaining empirical distributions as close as possible to those of the populations of each city. In total, more than 3,100 individuals participated in 148 sessions.
In this paper we take into account the result of one activity, namely the Trust Game, where participants were assigned to pairs. Half played the role of player 1 and half played the role of player 2. Players never met, but were informed about some of the other player's characteristics (age, sex, education level and neighborhood of residence). Both players were
given an endowment in local currency (approximately $5). Player1 was asked to decide how much to sent to player 2. The options given were $0, $1.25, $2.5, $3.75 or $5 corresponding respectively to 0% 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of his endowment. The amount chosen by player 1 was trebled and sent to player 2. In a separate room, player 2 was asked 5 The database is publicly available. For a full description of the experimental setting and survey see and Candelo and Polanía (2007) to decide how much to return to player 1 for each possible offer from player 1. 6 After making the decision, both players were asked to predict the decisions made by the other player.
This game allows us to measure trust and reciprocity. The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is that neither player sends anything to the other. Player 2 has no incentive whatsoever to send to player 1. Anything that he sends to player 1 is less money that he keeps. A rational player 1, reasoning by backward induction will therefore send nothing to player 2. On the other hand, if player 1 and player 2 were close friends who planned to share the earnings of the game or if there existed a commitment device to equally sharing the joint payoffs it would be in the best interest of both players that player 1 would send his whole endowment to player 2. Comparing the Nash equilibrium with the players' social optimum it follows that higher initial offers (by player 1) are interpreted as signals of more trust and higher returns by player 2 are interpreted as signals of more reciprocity. Because each player knows the socio-economic characteristics of the other player, this game isolates the extent of trust and reciprocity among individuals by controlling for individual's characteristics.
After the games were played, all players were surveyed and personal information was gathered. The post-games survey allows us to build several measures of religious participation: i) whether an individual belongs to a religious organization, ii) if he participates in meetings of the religious organization and iii) how many hours a month he dedicates to religious activities.
Econometric specification
Our econometric setting is defined by the following model:
where j indexes the city and i the household (or individual) We compute Trust as the percentage of money that player 1 initially transfers to player 2. Player 1 is given the chance to transfer nothing, 25%, 50%,75% or 100% to player 2, without knowing how much money player 2 will transfer back. Thus, our measure of
Trust takes values 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, or 1.
We compute Reciprocity for every possible initial transfer from player 1, as the money player 2 is willing to return to player 1 expressed as a percentage of the total amount of money received by player 2 (including the initial endowment received at the start of the game). For each player 2, reciprocity is a variable that takes values form 0 (when player 2 does not return money to player 1) to 1 (when player 2 returns all the money received to player 1). For instance: if player 1 sends 0 then player 2 has only his initial endowment and is given the change to send to player to $0, $1.25, $2.5, $3.75 or $5 corresponding to 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of the money he has available. If player 1 send $2.5 (50% of his endowment), player 2 ends up with $12.5 ($5+$2.5*3). He is giving the chance to send back to player 1 $0.00, $1.25, $2.50, $3.75, $5.00, $6.25, $7.50, $8.75, $10.00, $11.25, $12.50 corresponding respectively to 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% or 100% of the money he has available. Since we are using the strategy method player 2 gives five different reciprocity answers, one corresponding to each hypothetical amount player 1 might have send him.
Our main explanatory variable reflects different dimensions of religiosity. The survey does not enquire about religious beliefs but about religious participation. We consider three dimensions of religious participation: be a member of a religious organization (Member), attending regular meetings (Meetings) of a religious organization, and the amount of monthly hours dedicated to religious activities within an organization (Hours).
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In the estimation we include several socio-demographic characteristics including age, gender, education, and socio-economic level. Psychological studies affirm that older individuals trust other individuals more than younger individuals (Stolle, 1998 Finally, Trust is conditioned on the degree of risk aversion since risk aversion may be a form of lack of trust. The degree of risk aversion is computed on the results of a Risk
Game in which each player makes individual decisions to choose over a set of six 50/50 lotteries that go from a sure low payoff to an all-or-nothing higher expected payoff.
Choosing lotteries with lower average payoffs and lower variance of the payoffs is interpreted as greater risk aversion. Based on those decisions the risk aversion level of the participant is categorized as low, medium or high. Table 1 reproduces Table A1 of Cárdenas et al (2009) showing basic demographic characteristics and characteristics of the games in each city. Jose shows the highest institutional affiliation (23.1%). About 15.6% of individuals attend regular meetings. On average, individuals in our sample dedicate slightly more than 2 hours per month to activities related to religious organizations. Table 3 shows that players' 1 sent, on average, 44.6% of their endowment to players' 2 and they were reciprocated with 23.7% on players' 2 endowment. Clearly players do not play the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and act in a more cooperative Overall, we do not find any significant effect of any of our three dimensions of religiosity on trust. In contrast, we find that that the three measures of religiosity are statistically significant associated with reciprocity. Table 4 shows that trust (the percentage transferred by player 1 to player 2) is positively and significantly associated with the percentage of money player 1expects to receive back from player 2. In other words, the more one expects to receive back, the more one is willing to give. Interestingly, while individuals showing the highest level of risk aversion are not willing to transfer more than less risk-averse individuals, those with an intermediate level of risk aversion, indeed do trust other individual more. While we find no significant differences according to gender or age, more educated individuals trust more than less educated individuals and individuals of higher socioeconomic level trust more than the individuals of lower socioeconomic level.
Results
Reciprocity is significantly and positively associated with the amount of money he expects to receive from the other person. Older individuals reciprocate more than younger individuals. Also, the higher socioeconomic level individuals do reciprocate more than individuals of lower socioeconomic level. Women reciprocate less than men. Finally, education appears not to impact on individuals' willingness to reciprocate. This is shown in the following tables Documento de Investigación -ISSN 1688 -6275 -No. 69 -2011 Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Conclusion
Using evidence from experimental and survey data on different attitudes and beliefs from Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, and San José (Costa Rica), we test the impact of three self-reported dimensions of religious participation on attitudes reflecting trust and reciprocity. The three dimensions of religiosity include being a member 14 of a religious organization, attending religious meetings, and the number of monthly hours dedicated to religious activities.
We do not find any significant effect of religious participation on attitudes towards trust but we do find that religious participation is positively correlated with reciprocity in our three proxy variables.
One could ask what are the fundamental differences between Trust and Reciprocity which allow for different associations with Religiosity? Religion may induce more trust within a specific religious group (the group effect) but it appears that the effect does not generalize. On the other hand, religiosity affects reciprocity suggesting religious individuals show more gratitude even when we control for expectations of other people´s behavior.
One limitation of this study is that the data does not allow us to measure participant's religious affiliation. Thus, although most of our players are probably catholic
Christians, we cannot differentiate between different religions.
